writing-skills
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The
render-graphs.jsscript utilizeschild_process.execSyncto invoke the system'sdot(Graphviz) command. While the script passes input viastdinrather than shell arguments, executing system binaries on data parsed from local markdown files constitutes a risk if the Graphviz binary is vulnerable or the input files are attacker-controlled.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The filepersuasion-principles.mdinstructs developers to use authoritative and non-negotiable language such as 'YOU MUST' and 'No exceptions'. Although intended for improving skill robustness, these linguistic patterns are identical to those used in adversarial prompt injection to bypass agent constraints.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (LOW): The rendering utility introduces an indirect prompt injection surface.\n - Ingestion points: The script reads untrusted content from
SKILL.mdusingfs.readFileSync.\n - Boundary markers: It relies on markdown code block delimiters (```dot) to identify executable content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses subprocess execution (
execSync) and file-system write capabilities (fs.writeFileSync).\n - Sanitization: There is no validation or sanitization of the DOT language source before it is passed to the system renderer.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The script performs runtime extraction and execution of DOT source code to generate visual assets, which classifies as dynamic execution of embedded source via external system utilities.
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