magicblock

[Skill Scanner] Installation of third-party script detected This SKILL.md is documentation for a third-party Solana execution layer (MagicBlock Ephemeral Rollups). I find no explicit malware or obfuscated/backdoor code in the provided text. The primary risk is a trust/supply-chain risk: the design requires delegating PDA ownership and routing execution and commits through vendor-controlled endpoints (devnet.magicblock.app / devnet-router.magicblock.app) and instructs clients to skip preflight checks. Those patterns are coherent with the product's stated purpose but introduce meaningful security exposure (potential for unauthorized state changes or data exposure if the operator or validators are malicious or compromised). Integrators should treat the delegation step and ER endpoints as high-trust operations, require strong attestation of TEEs, and prefer audit/attestation details before production use. LLM verification: The content is an operational guide for a third-party Ephemeral Rollup service and is plausibly legitimate. No explicit malware patterns or hard-coded secrets are present in the provided fragment. However, the design requires high trust in MagicBlock infrastructure: delegation grants the delegation program control over PDAs, network flows route through MagicBlock endpoints, and developer instructions include an unpinned git install and recommending skipPreflight: true. These are significant supp