agent-teams

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 13, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill defines a framework for inter-agent communication and shared task management that is highly susceptible to indirect injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the execution context through TaskCreate (subject and description fields) and SendMessage (message content).
  • Boundary markers: The skill provides no delimiters or instructions to help sub-agents distinguish between data to be processed and instructions to be followed.
  • Capability inventory: The skill spawns agents with subagent_type="general-purpose", granting them full access to workspace tools, including file modification and command execution.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is defined for data moved between agents or stored in the shared task list.
  • [Data Exposure] (LOW): The skill identifies and uses configuration paths such as ~/.claude/settings.json and internal state directories in ~/.claude/teams/. While these involve sensitive locations, the documented usage is limited to standard configuration setup and local state persistence.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 13, 2026, 09:02 PM