skills/shihyuho/skills/time-to-skill/Gen Agent Trust Hub

time-to-skill

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The installation instructions (npx skills add shihyuho/skills) involve downloading code from a third-party GitHub repository that is not on the trusted whitelist.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE] (HIGH): The skill's primary function is to record "Exact commands used" and "Code templates" from user activity. If a user executes commands containing sensitive secrets (e.g., API keys or passwords) multiple times, the skill will automatically capture these into persistent pattern documentation files, leading to sensitive data exposure.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): This skill represents a significant indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: It monitors all user interactions, including data the user may be processing from untrusted external sources (e.g., a README from another repo).
  • Boundary markers: None. The skill directly extracts text and commands into documentation templates without delimiters.
  • Capability inventory: The documented patterns are passed to skill-creator, which has the capability to generate and execute new SKILL.md files. This allows an attacker to potentially trick the agent into creating a persistent, malicious skill based on 'observed' behavior.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the captured content before it is prepared for skill creation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (MEDIUM): The "OpenCode Plugin" functionality explicitly injects a system prompt reminder into every session, which modifies the agent's core instructions and forces a state of constant monitoring without explicit per-task consent.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 07:43 AM