subagents-orchestration-guide

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an "Autonomous Execution Mode" where authority for file modifications ("Edit"/"Write") and shell commands ("git commit" via "Bash") is delegated to subagents after a single batch approval. This reduction in human-in-the-loop oversight during the implementation phase increases the impact of potential prompt injection attacks.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface:
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data from user requirements and structured JSON responses from subagents enter the context (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions for the agent to treat subagent output or user requirements purely as data or to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The framework utilizes high-privilege tools including "Edit", "Write", and "Bash" (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: Absent. No escaping or validation is specified for data passed between agents.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The orchestration logic combines file-read capabilities ("Grep", "Glob", "Read") with network-access tools ("WebSearch"). Data from local files could potentially be exfiltrated through search queries or external research tasks performed by subagents like the "requirement-analyzer".
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use "Bash" to execute "git commit". This provides a mechanism for shell command execution that could be abused if parameters such as commit messages are derived from unsanitized external input.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 23, 2026, 10:47 AM