sub-agents

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/run_subagent.py executes external AI command-line tools like claude, codex, and gemini using subprocess.Popen. This mechanism allows the skill to run arbitrary commands within the environment provided by these external agents.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: For users of the Codex environment, the skill specifically instructs the use of require_escalated permissions in references/codex.md. This bypasses standard sandbox restrictions to allow access to local session files, presenting a privilege escalation surface.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to handle untrusted user input and combine it with file-based context, creating a significant indirect prompt injection surface.\n
  • Ingestion points: Processes user-provided strings via the --prompt argument and reads agent definition files from the .agents/ directory.\n
  • Boundary markers: Relies on simple text-based headers like [System Context] and [User Prompt] to separate instructions, which can be easily circumvented by adversarial inputs.\n
  • Capability inventory: The sub-agents invoked have the ability to execute code, read files, and interact with external APIs.\n
  • Sanitization: The script performs no content validation or escaping of the user-provided prompt before execution.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The script accesses the CLI_API_KEY environment variable and passes it as a command-line argument (-a) when invoking cursor-agent. This practice makes the secret key visible in the system's process list to other users or applications.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive session information at ~/.codex/sessions. While intended for context sharing between agents, this access to private session metadata constitutes a potential data exposure risk.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 28, 2026, 05:47 AM