NYC

agent-browser

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill includes an eval command that allows arbitrary JavaScript execution in the browser.
  • Evidence: agent-browser eval "document.title" command in SKILL.md.
  • Risk: This can be used to manipulate page logic, bypass security controls, or exfiltrate sensitive data from the browser's memory or DOM.
  • [Data Exposure & Exfiltration] (MEDIUM): Commands like set credentials and state save/load handle sensitive authentication information.
  • Evidence: agent-browser set credentials user pass and agent-browser state save auth.json in SKILL.md.
  • Risk: Handling credentials via CLI and saving authentication state (cookies/tokens) to local files creates a risk of exposure if logs or the filesystem are accessed by unauthorized parties.
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The skill is a high-risk surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes data from untrusted external websites.
  • Ingestion points: agent-browser open, snapshot, and get text fetch content from arbitrary URLs.
  • Boundary markers: No specific markers are used to isolate untrusted web content from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to Bash commands, file system writes (screenshot, pdf), and the ability to execute network requests via the browser.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the web content before it is processed by the LLM.
  • [Privilege Escalation] (MEDIUM): The --cdp flag allows connecting to a running browser instance.
  • Evidence: agent-browser --cdp 9222 snapshot in SKILL.md.
  • Risk: This could allow an agent to hijack an existing user session via the Chrome DevTools Protocol, gaining access to authenticated sites and private data without explicit user consent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 05:28 PM