NYC

content-creator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (LOW): The core logic in references/full-guide.md instructs the agent to 'discover' project context by reading arbitrary files like .agents/SYSTEM/ARCHITECTURE.md and existing newsletters/tweets. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if those source files contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Multiple project files and historical content mentioned in references/full-guide.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions for the agent to treat the discovered content as untrusted or to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill focus is text generation, but it acts as a data aggregator that could influence future agent actions.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not provide any patterns for sanitizing or escaping the content it reads.
  • [External Downloads] (LOW): The SKILL.md file suggests that users install an external plugin from an untrusted GitHub user (coreyhaines31/marketingskills). While the installation requires user consent, recommending unverified third-party code increases the potential attack surface.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 05:29 PM