gsd-research-phase
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directly interpolates user-provided input from the $ARGUMENTS variable into shell commands within the Step 0 initialization block:
node {{PLATFORM_ROOT}}/get-shit-done/bin/gsd-tools.cjs init phase-op "$ARGUMENTS". This pattern is susceptible to command injection if the input contains shell metacharacters like semicolons or backticks, allowing arbitrary execution beyond the intended script. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It ingests data from external project files and passes them to a sub-agent for processing. * Ingestion points:
requirements_path,context_path, andstate_path(SKILL.md). * Boundary markers: Absent; the content is passed to the sub-agent via theTaskprompt without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. * Capability inventory:Bash,Read, andTasktools. * Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the file contents is performed before they are processed by the LLM. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and reads local file paths, including project requirements, state, and planning documents. While this is part of its core functionality, it represents a data exposure risk as sensitive project information is processed by the agent and its sub-agents.
Audit Metadata