skills/shuoli84/tot_spec/tot-spec/Gen Agent Trust Hub

tot-spec

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The code generator implementation in references/rpc.md is vulnerable to injection attacks due to unsafe interpolation of user-controlled data into source code templates.\n
  • Ingestion points: The tool reads untrusted YAML specification files from user-defined folders to define data structures and RPC methods.\n
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are present to prevent embedded instructions in the YAML from influencing the generator.\n
  • Capability inventory: The generator uses std::fs::read_to_string and std::fs::write to read inputs and generate executable code files, posing a risk if the output is compiled or executed.\n
  • Sanitization: None identified. The generate_handlers function in references/rpc.md directly formats YAML fields like method.request and method.response into Rust trait definitions using format!, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary Rust logic by crafting malicious YAML values.\n- [External Downloads] (LOW): The SKILL.md instructions recommend installing tot_spec_cli using cargo install. While cargo is a standard tool, the package itself originates from an untrusted source, which is a common vector for supply chain attacks.\n- [Command Execution] (LOW): The skill documentation includes several examples of command execution (e.g., tot_spec -i <folder>, cargo install) which involve executing software and scripts on the local filesystem.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 11:21 AM