agentflow

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires cloning a repository from an unverified third-party account (UrRhb/agentflow) during the installation process.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Following the download, the user is instructed to install and execute shell scripts and AI worker processes directly from the unverified source.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill establishes persistence by requiring the user to configure a crontab entry (*/15 * * * * ~/.claude/sdlc/agentflow-cron.sh) that executes the orchestrator script every 15 minutes.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from external sources (Kanban board comments and SPEC.md) without documented sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: Kanban board task comments and SPEC.md file content (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the skill does not specify the use of delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in ingested data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands including npm test, tsc, eslint, and git revert, as well as dispatching autonomous worker agents.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is described for the data processed from the Kanban board or specification files.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 14, 2026, 08:35 AM