apify-ecommerce
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
run_actor.jsscript appends theAPIFY_TOKENas a query parameter to API request URLs (e.g.,https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/.../runs?token=...). This practice can expose the sensitive token in server logs, proxy logs, and browser history. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a Node.js script that accepts a user-defined
--outputfile path. This path is passed directly towriteFileSync, which could allow the overwriting of sensitive local files if the path is manipulated and the execution environment lacks proper sandboxing. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and summarize large datasets from external e-commerce sites, which introduces an indirect prompt injection surface. Malicious actors could embed instructions on scraped pages to influence the agent's summary or behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched from Apify datasets and processed via
run_actor.js. - Boundary markers: No explicit markers or isolation techniques are used to separate scraped content from agent instructions in the suggested workflow.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform network requests (
fetch) and write to the local file system (writeFileSync). - Sanitization: Scraped content is not sanitized for potential malicious instructions before being presented to the agent for summarization.
Audit Metadata