basecamp-automation

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the configuration of an external MCP server at https://rube.app/mcp. This domain is not associated with a recognized trusted organization or well-known service, posing a risk when delegating task execution to an unverified remote endpoint.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Because the skill utilizes a remote MCP server, sensitive data retrieved from Basecamp (including project details, message boards, and personnel lists) is processed through the rube.app infrastructure. This creates a potential exposure vector for private organizational data.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill exposes high-privilege tools such as BASECAMP_PUT_PROJECTS_PEOPLE_USERS, which enables the agent to grant or revoke project access and create new user accounts. Malicious instructions could potentially abuse these administrative capabilities.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]:
  • Indirect Prompt Injection: The skill is designed to read and process content from Basecamp messages and to-do lists, which are sources of untrusted data.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested via BASECAMP_GET_MESSAGE and BASECAMP_GET_BUCKETS_TODOLISTS_TODOS (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded within the Basecamp messages it reads.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to modify project permissions and send messages, which could be exploited through a data-driven attack.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation or sanitization before processing Basecamp data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 18, 2026, 03:48 PM