github-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from GitHub sources while possessing high-impact write permissions.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from external sources via
GITHUB_LIST_REPOSITORY_ISSUES,GITHUB_GET_A_PULL_REQUEST,GITHUB_GET_REPOSITORY_CONTENT, andGITHUB_SEARCH_CODE(defined in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" directives to isolate external content from agent prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-impact capabilities including
GITHUB_MERGE_A_PULL_REQUEST,GITHUB_DELETE_A_REPOSITORY, andGITHUB_UPDATE_BRANCH_PROTECTION(defined in SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of content fetched from the GitHub API is specified.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires a connection to a remote MCP server at
https://rube.app/mcpto access automation tools and manage GitHub OAuth authentication. This endpoint is the vendor's primary infrastructure for the skill.
Audit Metadata