google-slides-automation

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 27, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute local Python scripts (scripts/auth.py and scripts/slides.py) to manage authentication and interact with the Google Slides API. The source code for these scripts is not provided, making their behavior unverifiable.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill describes an unconventional OAuth refresh process that uses an external 'cloud function' instead of local client credentials. This architecture typically requires sending the user's refresh tokens to a remote endpoint, which is a significant security risk for credential theft.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The use of a remote cloud function to handle OAuth tokens creates a potential path for exfiltrating sensitive access credentials. Furthermore, the referenced scripts request full read/write access to the user's Google Slides presentations.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. It ingests untrusted text data from Google Slides via the get-text command without specifying boundary markers or sanitization logic. Mandatory evidence: 1. Ingestion point: scripts/slides.py get-text reads slide content. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. 3. Capability inventory: batch-update, create, add-slide, replace-text, and delete-slide. 4. Sanitization: Absent. This could allow malicious instructions embedded in a slide to influence the agent's subsequent actions.
  • [NO_CODE]: The skill relies on external scripts located in the scripts/ directory that are not included in the provided analysis. This prevents verification of the OAuth flow and API interaction logic.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Apr 27, 2026, 09:20 PM