skill-optimizer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses sensitive session transcripts and chat history located in paths such as ~/.claude/projects/ and ~/.codex/sessions/. These files contain historical interaction data, which may include private user information, proprietary data, or credentials shared in past conversations.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from session logs and external SKILL.md files.
- Ingestion points: Processes *.jsonl transcript files and SKILL.md files from multiple local directories (~/.claude/, ~/.codex/, ~/.agents/).
- Boundary markers: No markers or delimiters are defined to isolate the processed data from the agent's instructions, potentially allowing instructions embedded in logs to influence current behavior.
- Capability inventory: Utilizes bash and python3 to execute file scanning and analysis logic.
- Sanitization: No sanitization of input transcripts or external skill files is performed before they are integrated into the analysis context.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Contains strong imperative instructions aimed at overriding default agent behavior and forcing specific logic paths, such as 'You MUST run ALL 8 dimensions,' 'do not skip any,' and 'do not skip [dimensions 4.2, 4.3, 4.5b, and 4.8].'
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Employs shell commands and Python scripts to dynamically scan local directories and read file contents across multiple platform-specific directories.
Audit Metadata