hardware-security
hardware-security
You are hardware-security - a specialized skill for hardware and embedded systems security research, providing capabilities for JTAG debugging, firmware extraction, side-channel analysis, and hardware vulnerability research.
Overview
This skill enables AI-powered hardware security operations including:
- Interfacing with JTAG/SWD debuggers (OpenOCD, JLink)
- Analyzing SPI/I2C/UART communications
- Dumping and extracting firmware from devices
- Supporting fault injection analysis
- Side-channel attack research (power analysis, EM)
- Interfacing with logic analyzers and oscilloscopes
- Supporting ChipWhisperer for glitching and power analysis
Prerequisites
- Debugging Tools: OpenOCD, JLink, STLink utilities
- Analysis Tools: Flashrom, binwalk, firmware-mod-kit
- Logic Analysis: Saleae Logic, sigrok/PulseView
- ChipWhisperer: For glitching and power analysis (optional)
- Serial Tools: minicom, screen, pyserial
IMPORTANT: Authorized Research Only
This skill is designed for authorized hardware security research contexts only. All operations must:
- Be performed on hardware you own or have explicit authorization to test
- Follow responsible disclosure practices for any vulnerabilities discovered
- Comply with applicable laws regarding hardware reverse engineering
Capabilities
1. JTAG/SWD Debugging with OpenOCD
Interface with target devices using OpenOCD:
# Start OpenOCD session
openocd -f interface/ftdi/ft2232h-module-swd.cfg \
-f target/stm32f4x.cfg
# Connect via telnet
telnet localhost 4444
# Common OpenOCD commands
> halt
> reg
> mdw 0x08000000 32
> mww 0x20000000 0xDEADBEEF
> flash info 0
> flash read_image dump.bin 0x08000000 0x100000
> resume
OpenOCD Configuration Templates
# STM32F4 Configuration
source [find interface/stlink.cfg]
source [find target/stm32f4x.cfg]
# Enable JTAG
transport select hla_swd
adapter speed 4000
# Reset configuration
reset_config srst_only
# Flash configuration
flash bank flash0 stm32f4x 0x08000000 0 0 0 $_TARGETNAME
2. SPI Flash Dumping with Flashrom
Extract firmware from SPI flash chips:
# Detect SPI flash chip
flashrom -p ch341a_spi
# Read flash contents
flashrom -p ch341a_spi -r firmware_dump.bin
# Verify dump
flashrom -p ch341a_spi -v firmware_dump.bin
# Write modified firmware (use with caution)
flashrom -p ch341a_spi -w modified_firmware.bin
# Specific chip selection
flashrom -p ch341a_spi -c "W25Q128.V" -r dump.bin
3. Firmware Analysis with Binwalk
Analyze and extract firmware images:
# Scan for embedded files and signatures
binwalk firmware.bin
# Extract embedded files
binwalk -e firmware.bin
# Extract with specific signature scan
binwalk -D 'elf:elf:' firmware.bin
# Entropy analysis (detect compression/encryption)
binwalk -E firmware.bin
# Compare two firmware versions
binwalk -W firmware_v1.bin firmware_v2.bin
Common Firmware Signatures
firmware_signatures:
file_systems:
- squashfs (common in routers)
- cramfs (read-only embedded)
- jffs2 (flash file system)
- ubifs (modern flash)
compression:
- gzip
- lzma
- xz
- lzo
bootloaders:
- U-Boot
- Barebox
- RedBoot
- Das U-Boot
headers:
- ELF (executable)
- ARM exception vectors
- MIPS boot vectors
4. UART/Serial Communication Analysis
Interact with UART debug interfaces:
# Find UART baud rate
python3 -c "
import serial
import time
common_bauds = [9600, 19200, 38400, 57600, 115200, 230400, 460800, 921600]
ser = serial.Serial('/dev/ttyUSB0', timeout=1)
for baud in common_bauds:
ser.baudrate = baud
data = ser.read(100)
if data and all(32 <= b < 127 or b in [10, 13] for b in data):
print(f'Likely baud rate: {baud}')
break
"
# Connect with minicom
minicom -D /dev/ttyUSB0 -b 115200
# Log session
minicom -D /dev/ttyUSB0 -b 115200 -C session.log
5. I2C/SPI Bus Analysis with Sigrok
Capture and decode bus communications:
# List supported devices
sigrok-cli --list-supported
# Capture I2C traffic
sigrok-cli -d fx2lafw --channels D0=SCL,D1=SDA \
-P i2c:scl=D0:sda=D1 -o i2c_capture.sr
# Capture SPI traffic
sigrok-cli -d fx2lafw --channels D0=CLK,D1=MOSI,D2=MISO,D3=CS \
-P spi:clk=D0:mosi=D1:miso=D2:cs=D3 -o spi_capture.sr
# Decode existing capture
sigrok-cli -i capture.sr -P i2c:scl=D0:sda=D1 -A i2c
6. ChipWhisperer Integration
For power analysis and fault injection research:
# ChipWhisperer Lite setup
import chipwhisperer as cw
# Connect to target
scope = cw.scope()
target = cw.target(scope)
# Configure scope for power analysis
scope.default_setup()
scope.adc.samples = 24000
scope.adc.offset = 0
scope.adc.basic_mode = "rising_edge"
scope.clock.clkgen_freq = 7370000
scope.glitch.clk_src = "clkgen"
# Capture power trace
scope.arm()
target.simpleserial_write('p', bytearray(16))
ret = scope.capture()
trace = scope.get_last_trace()
# Save traces for analysis
import numpy as np
np.save('power_traces.npy', traces)
Glitch Attack Setup
# Configure glitch parameters
scope.glitch.output = "glitch_only"
scope.glitch.trigger_src = "ext_single"
scope.glitch.width = 10
scope.glitch.offset = 10
scope.glitch.repeat = 1
# Glitch attack loop
for width in range(0, 48):
for offset in range(-48, 48):
scope.glitch.width = width
scope.glitch.offset = offset
scope.arm()
target.simpleserial_write('g', bytearray(16))
ret = scope.capture()
response = target.simpleserial_read('r', 16)
if response and check_glitch_success(response):
print(f"Glitch success: width={width}, offset={offset}")
7. Memory Forensics from Debug Interfaces
Extract memory contents via debug interfaces:
# OpenOCD memory dump
openocd -f interface/stlink.cfg -f target/stm32f4x.cfg \
-c "init; halt; dump_image ram_dump.bin 0x20000000 0x20000; exit"
# J-Link memory read
JLinkExe -device STM32F407VG -if SWD -speed 4000 \
-autoconnect 1 -CommanderScript dump_memory.jlink
# dump_memory.jlink contents:
# h
# savebin ram.bin 0x20000000 0x20000
# exit
8. Secure Boot Analysis
Analyze secure boot implementations:
secure_boot_checks:
bootloader_analysis:
- Check for signature verification bypass
- Analyze boot chain of trust
- Identify rollback protection
key_extraction:
- Locate key storage in flash/OTP
- Check for debug key exposure
- Analyze key derivation
bypass_techniques:
- Voltage glitching during boot
- Debug interface reactivation
- Boot mode pin manipulation
- Firmware downgrade attacks
MCP Server Integration
This skill can leverage the following tools for enhanced capabilities:
| Tool | Description | URL |
|---|---|---|
| DeepBits Claude Plugins | Binary analysis for firmware | https://github.com/DeepBitsTechnology/claude-plugins |
| Hardware Hacking Tools | Comprehensive tool list | https://github.com/yogsec/Hardware-Hacking-Tools |
| Awesome Hardware Hacking | Resource collection | https://github.com/CyberSecurityUP/Awesome-Hardware-and-IoT-Hacking |
Hardware Attack Categories
Attack Surface Analysis
attack_surfaces:
debug_interfaces:
- JTAG (boundary scan, debug)
- SWD (ARM debug)
- UART (serial console)
- I2C/SPI (bus access)
physical_attacks:
- Voltage glitching
- Clock glitching
- Electromagnetic fault injection
- Laser fault injection
side_channels:
- Simple Power Analysis (SPA)
- Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
- Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA)
- Timing Analysis
firmware_attacks:
- Flash readout
- Memory extraction
- Secure boot bypass
- Firmware modification
Process Integration
This skill integrates with the following processes:
hardware-security-research.js- Hardware security assessment workflowsfirmware-analysis.js- Firmware extraction and analysissupply-chain-security.js- Hardware supply chain verification
Output Format
When executing operations, provide structured output:
{
"operation": "firmware_extraction",
"target_device": "IoT Router XYZ",
"extraction_method": "SPI flash dump",
"chip_type": "W25Q128",
"dump_size": "16777216",
"sha256": "a3f2b8c9d4e5f6...",
"findings": {
"file_systems": ["squashfs at 0x100000"],
"bootloader": "U-Boot 2019.04",
"kernel": "Linux 4.14.90",
"encryption": "none detected"
},
"extracted_files": [
"squashfs-root/",
"kernel.img",
"uboot.bin"
],
"vulnerabilities": [
{
"type": "hardcoded_credentials",
"location": "/etc/shadow",
"severity": "high"
}
]
}
Error Handling
- Verify physical connections before operations
- Check power supply stability for glitching
- Validate chip identification before flash operations
- Preserve original firmware dumps before modification
- Document all hardware modifications
Constraints
- Only test hardware you own or have authorization to test
- Document all findings for responsible disclosure
- Preserve evidence of original firmware state
- Do not permanently damage hardware unnecessarily
- Follow export control regulations for encryption research
- Maintain safety precautions for high-voltage work