Deal Auto-Tagger
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface due to its processing of untrusted external content.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through meeting transcripts fetched via
list_meetingsand deal activities viaget_deal_activities(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit delimiters or specific instructions to disregard malicious or manipulative content embedded within the meeting transcripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the
update_dealcapability (SKILL.md), which provides write access to the CRM for applying tags. - Sanitization: There is no documented logic for sanitizing or filtering input from meeting transcripts before it is processed for tagging logic.
Audit Metadata