Detect Intents
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it processes untrusted meeting transcripts and translates them into automated system actions.
- Ingestion points: The skill consumes a 'transcript' input string which originates from external meeting recordings (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The agent instructions do not provide explicit delimiters or clear directives to ignore instructions that might be embedded in the transcript text.
- Capability inventory: The skill can trigger various platform tools, including those for proposal generation, calendar management, and system access provisioning.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of transcript content validation or sanitization to prevent adversarial manipulation of the intent detection process.
Audit Metadata