Email Send-as-Rep

This is a well-scoped send-as-rep skill that requires high-impact permissions (gmail.send / Mail.Send) and reads sensitive context (thread history, CRM, copilot memory). Those capabilities are coherent with the stated purpose (to send real emails on behalf of a rep) and the spec defines strong mitigations: mandatory human approval, 30-second undo window, audit logging with body hashes, and no auto-send or batch sends. The primary security risks are operational: (1) compromise of the approval channel (Slack or copilot chat) could allow unauthorized sends; (2) storage/handling of OAuth refresh_tokens and audit/CRM logs must be implemented securely to avoid credential leakage; and (3) preview truncation or human error during approval could permit malicious or private content to be sent. There is no evidence of obfuscation, download-execute chains, third-party intermediary routing for sends, or intentional credential harvesting in this spec. Overall, the document appears functionally consistent with its purpose but carries moderate operational risk because of the powerful send capability it enables — those risks must be addressed in implementation (secure token storage, MFA and protection for approval channel, thorough previewing).