use-slicer

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 8, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the use of sudo to manage the Slicer daemon and networking components (e.g., sudo -E slicer up ./sandbox.yaml).
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to access and manage sensitive local files, such as the GitHub personal access token stored at ~/.slicer/gh-access-token and host SSH keys.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Fetches and executes the K3s installation script from the well-known get.k3s.io service within the microVM.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The 'Agent Sandbox' feature automatically transfers sensitive credentials from the host machine (including secrets for Amp, Claude, and Codex) into the microVMs to facilitate agent operations.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection as it facilitates copying entire workspace directories into a VM where an AI agent executes code.
  • Ingestion points: Workspace paths used in slicer amp, slicer claude, slicer codex, and files transferred via slicer vm cp.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are provided to mitigate the risk of embedded instructions in workspace files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill provides extensive capabilities within the VM, including arbitrary command execution (slicer vm exec), interactive shells (slicer vm shell), and port forwarding.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the transferred workspace data is documented.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://get.k3s.io - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 8, 2026, 05:09 AM