NYC
skills/smithery/ai/agent-creator/Gen Agent Trust Hub

agent-creator

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill ingests user requirements and scenarios to generate executable agent configurations. This surface can be exploited to create malicious sub-agents with hidden capabilities.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided goals and specific scenarios (SKILL.md Step 1).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; user input is directly used to formulate the sub-agent's identity and behavior.
  • Capability inventory: Ability to write persistent configuration files to .claude/agents/ and ~/.claude/agents/, and configure shell-based execution hooks.
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of user-provided logic or scripts before implementation.
  • [Privilege Escalation] (HIGH): The skill provides explicit instructions and templates for using bypassPermissions, permissionMode: dontAsk, and permissionMode: bypassPermissions. These settings allow sub-agents to perform actions like file editing and command execution without the user's explicit consent for each action.
  • [Persistence Mechanisms] (HIGH): The skill automates writing agent definitions to the user's global agent directory (~/.claude/agents/). This allows a sub-agent created during a single session to persist and be active across all future projects and sessions for that user.
  • [Dynamic Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill facilitates the configuration of hooks (PreToolUse and PostToolUse) that execute shell commands (e.g., command: "./scripts/run-linter.sh"). While the provided examples are benign, the mechanism allows for arbitrary command execution whenever specific tools are used by the generated sub-agent.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 08:30 AM