atlassian
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill provides an attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in Jira tickets can control the agent.
- Ingestion points: Commands such as
acli jira workitem view,acli jira workitem search, andacli jira workitem comment listfetch data from external, potentially attacker-controlled sources. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions provided to help the agent distinguish between Jira data and its own system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool and can modify Jira state viacreate,edit,transition, andcommentcommands. - Sanitization: No evidence of data sanitization or validation is present in the skill instructions.
- Command Execution (MEDIUM): The skill relies extensively on the
Bashtool. If untrusted Jira ticket content is interpolated into shell commands without strict escaping, it could lead to command injection on the host system. - External Downloads (LOW): The skill depends on the Atlassian CLI (
acli). While the installation script is not included in this file, the skill references official Atlassian developer documentation (developer.atlassian.com), which is a reputable source. Per the Trust-Scope-Rule, this finding is downgraded to LOW but does not affect the HIGH severity of the ingestion surface.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata