dingtalk-connection
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- Persistence Mechanisms (HIGH): The skill provides instructions to install a macOS LaunchAgent using
launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.clawdbot.dingtalk-bridge.plist. This allows the bridge service to persist across reboots and run in the background. - Data Exposure (MEDIUM): The skill documentation identifies
~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.jsonas a default configuration path. Accessing hidden configuration files in the home directory is a risk for sensitive data exposure. - Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill's core function is to ingest untrusted data from DingTalk users and relay it to an AI agent. This creates a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection where an external user could influence the agent's behavior. Evidence: 1. Ingestion points: bridge.py webhook endpoint. 2. Boundary markers: None mentioned in documentation. 3. Capability inventory: Relays messages to Clawdbot Gateway. 4. Sanitization: Not documented.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata