NYC
skills/smithery/ai/shadcn-ui/Gen Agent Trust Hub

shadcn-ui

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION] (HIGH): The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it retrieves and processes code from external sources.
  • Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context through web_fetch, mcp_shadcn* tools, and custom registries configured in components.json.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundaries or instructions are provided to the agent to treat external component source code or metadata as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has Bash and Write permissions, which allow for persistent system modification and arbitrary command execution.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the fetched content is performed before the agent acts upon it.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (HIGH): The instructions explicitly recommend using npx shadcn@latest, which downloads and executes remote code from the npm registry. This is a form of runtime remote code execution that bypasses static package verification.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill requests broad permissions including Bash and Write. While necessary for a CLI-based developer tool, these capabilities serve as critical exploit primitives if the agent is compromised via indirect prompt injection.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The tool is designed to facilitate the downloading of third-party components and their dependencies (Radix UI, Base UI, etc.) from external repositories and registries.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 04:25 AM