database-manager
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data (table names, query filters, and SQL migration strings) and execute them against production databases.
- Ingestion points: Variables such as
table,filters,data,schema, andmigration_sqlin the documented Python API and agent tools. - Boundary markers: None documented in the integration examples.
- Capability inventory: Full CRUD, schema modification (
ALTER/CREATE TABLE), and raw SQL execution (db.execute). - Sanitization: While the
db.executeexample uses parameterized queries, the high-leveldb.selectanddb.apply_schemamethods rely on the agent's ability to correctly structure queries, making it vulnerable to injection if the agent is manipulated by a user. - [Privilege Escalation] (HIGH): The skill metadata explicitly requests the
Bashtool. A database management skill should typically not require shell access. This provides a vector for an attacker to move from database access to full system compromise if the agent is compromised. - [Credentials Unsafe] (LOW): The documentation uses placeholders for API keys (
eyJ...) and environment variables. While safe in the documentation, the skill's architecture encourages the use ofservice_role_key, which bypasses Row Level Security (RLS) and increases the impact of any potential compromise. - [Unverifiable Dependencies] (LOW): Uses
libsql-experimental, which may contain unpatched vulnerabilities or unstable code paths compared to production-ready releases.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata