NYC
skills/smithery/ai/gog/Gen Agent Trust Hub

gog

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection. It retrieves untrusted content from external sources and provides tools to perform impactful actions based on that content.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads external data via gog gmail search, gog drive search, gog sheets get, and gog docs cat.
  • Boundary markers: There are no specified boundary markers or delimiters to isolate untrusted content from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill allows for high-impact write operations including gog gmail send (email exfiltration/spam), gog calendar create (scheduling), and gog sheets update (data manipulation).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation mechanisms are described for the data retrieved from Google APIs before it is processed by the agent.
  • External Downloads (MEDIUM): The installation process relies on a third-party Homebrew tap (steipete/tap/gogcli). While the developer may be known in other contexts, this repository is not in the predefined list of trusted sources, meaning the binary integrity cannot be verified by this analysis.
  • Command Execution (LOW): The skill is designed to execute a local binary (gog) to perform its tasks. While inherent to the skill's design, this grants the agent the ability to execute shell commands with the user's Google Workspace permissions.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 08:52 AM