nano-banana-pro
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection / Command Injection] (HIGH): The skill defines commands that interpolate untrusted user input directly into shell arguments via
uv run {baseDir}/scripts/generate_image.py --prompt "{prompt}". * Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the--promptand--filenamearguments in the bash command blocks. * Boundary markers: Although double quotes are used in examples, there are no explicit instructions for the agent to sanitize or shell-escape metacharacters (e.g., backticks, $(), or semicolons). * Capability inventory: The skill can execute sub-processes (uv run) and modify the local filesystem via--filename. * Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is present in the instruction file. - [External Downloads] (LOW): The metadata requests the installation of
uvvia Homebrew (brew install uv). While Homebrew anduvare reputable tools, this constitutes an external binary dependency that is installed on the host. - [Credentials Unsafe] (LOW): The skill requires a
GEMINI_API_KEYenvironment variable. While typical for API-based services, this highlights a dependency on sensitive credential management.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata