tmux-agents
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill relies on a series of shell scripts (
spawn.sh,check.sh,status.sh) located in the skill's directory. Specifically,spawn.shaccepts a positional<task>argument. If this script interpolates the task string into a command line (e.g.,tmux send-keysor directly into an agent CLI) without rigorous escaping, an attacker could execute arbitrary host commands using shell metacharacters (e.g.,; rm -rf /). - PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): The skill demonstrates a significant Category 8 (Indirect Prompt Injection) vulnerability surface. Ingestion points: The
<task>parameter in thespawn.shcommand. Boundary markers: Documentation shows no delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the task. Capability inventory: The agents being spawned (Claude Code, etc.) are explicitly described as capable of 'complex coding', 'full projects', and 'heavy refactoring', implying full filesystem and shell access. Sanitization: None described; raw strings are passed from the user/triggering agent to the sub-agent. - EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill documentation includes setup instructions for
ollama pullandbrewinstallations. While these are common tools, the skill encourages the installation of unverified models and system-level binaries which constitutes a medium-risk supply chain surface.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata