NYC
skills/smithery/ai/parallel-agents/Gen Agent Trust Hub

parallel-agents

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill instructs agents to use shell commands for status reporting (e.g., `echo "COMPLETE:
  • $(date)" >> .claude/cache/-status.txt`).
  • Evidence: If the <identifier> or <batch> variables are interpolated with untrusted data (e.g., a file name or user-provided ID), an attacker could perform command injection (e.g., setting an identifier to $(rm -rf /)).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION] (MEDIUM): The orchestration pattern relies on a shared status file for multiple agents to communicate completion.
  • Ingestion points: Agents write status/results to .claude/cache/ files which are later read by the orchestrator or user via cat, tail, and wc.
  • Boundary markers: None. The skill recommends simple line-based appending without delimiters or escaping.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestration involves launching background tasks (Task with run_in_background: true) and shell execution.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the data written to the status files is suggested.
  • Risk: If a sub-agent processes untrusted external data and includes parts of that data in its status message, it could poison the orchestration log. A downstream agent reading this log to determine its next action could be manipulated.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 08:20 AM