secops-triage
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by processing external, untrusted content while holding write/decision-making privileges (closing cases).
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested in
SKILL.mdvia tools likeget_case(reading alert/case descriptions) andudm_search/search_security_events(reading raw SIEM logs). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to treat the ingested case/log data as untrusted text rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
execute_bulk_close_caseto perform side-effects andcreate_case_commentto document reasoning based on the ingested data. - Sanitization: There is no logic provided to sanitize or filter the content of the alerts or logs before processing.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata