NYC
skills/smithery/ai/pdf/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pdf

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill extracts text from untrusted external files (PDFs) and processes it within the agent context. If a PDF contains malicious instructions, the agent may obey them because the skill lacks boundary markers or sanitization logic.
  • Ingestion points: Text extraction occurs in SKILL.md using pdftotext and the PyMuPDF (fitz) library's get_text() method.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The extracted content is treated as standard data without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell commands (pdftotext, pandoc, wkhtmltopdf) and file system write operations (result.save(), single.save()).
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or escaping extracted text before it is returned to the agent.
  • [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill frequently invokes shell processes (bash blocks) to run system utilities like pdftotext, pandoc, and wkhtmltopdf. While these are standard tools, executing them with potentially attacker-controlled filenames (e.g., input.pdf) without strict shell escaping could lead to command injection if filenames are not properly validated.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 06:33 AM