Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [Indirect Prompt Injection] (HIGH): The skill extracts text from untrusted external files (PDFs) and processes it within the agent context. If a PDF contains malicious instructions, the agent may obey them because the skill lacks boundary markers or sanitization logic.
- Ingestion points: Text extraction occurs in
SKILL.mdusingpdftotextand thePyMuPDF(fitz) library'sget_text()method. - Boundary markers: Absent. The extracted content is treated as standard data without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell commands (
pdftotext,pandoc,wkhtmltopdf) and file system write operations (result.save(),single.save()). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering or escaping extracted text before it is returned to the agent.
- [Command Execution] (MEDIUM): The skill frequently invokes shell processes (
bashblocks) to run system utilities likepdftotext,pandoc, andwkhtmltopdf. While these are standard tools, executing them with potentially attacker-controlled filenames (e.g.,input.pdf) without strict shell escaping could lead to command injection if filenames are not properly validated.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata