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skills/smithery/ai/skill-installer/Gen Agent Trust Hub

skill-installer

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The core functionality is to fetch and install new executable skills from remote sources. This is a direct vector for Remote Code Execution (RCE) if an untrusted or malicious repository is provided, as the agent will subsequently load and execute code from the installed directory.
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (HIGH): The skill is configured to download content from arbitrary GitHub repositories using the --repo and --url flags. While it targets openai/skills by default (a trusted source), it does not restrict downloads to that organization, allowing potentially malicious code ingestion from any GitHub user.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill relies on local Python scripts (list-skills.py, install-skill-from-github.py) that perform filesystem operations and network requests. The instructions explicitly mention requesting privilege escalation in sandbox environments to perform these tasks.
  • DATA_EXFILTRATION (LOW): The skill notes the use of sensitive credentials such as GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN for accessing private repositories. If the installation process is compromised or directed to a malicious endpoint, these tokens could be exposed.
  • INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW):
  • Ingestion points: The skill fetches repository structures and names from external sources via the GitHub API.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the agent may be susceptible to instructions embedded in repository names or metadata during the listing process.
  • Capability inventory: Network access, file system writing, and execution of helper scripts.
  • Sanitization: Not explicitly documented; the skill assumes the safety of the curated list but extends functionality to untrusted sources.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:10 PM