hono
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS] (MEDIUM): The skill installs and uses
@hono/cliandcreate-hono. These packages belong to thehonojsorganization, which is not included in the trusted source whitelist.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION] (MEDIUM): Indirect Prompt Injection surface detected. The skill useshono docsandhono searchto fetch external content that guides agent behavior.\n - Ingestion points: Remote documentation from
hono.devand local project files (src/index.ts).\n - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or instructions are provided to distinguish between documentation content and system directives.\n
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via
hono serve,hono request, andhono optimize.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of fetched documentation content.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): Commands like
hono serveandhono requestexecute the user's application code. This represents a capability that could be abused if the agent is influenced by malicious instructions to modify the project code prior to execution.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION] (MEDIUM): The skill recommends usingdeno run -A npm:create-honofor project initialization. The-Aflag grants the remote script full system access, posing a risk if the upstream package is compromised.
Audit Metadata