NYC
skills/smithery/ai/mcp-setup/Gen Agent Trust Hub

mcp-setup

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill facilitates the execution of arbitrary shell commands through the 'Custom MCP Server' section. It specifically constructs commands using user-provided input: claude mcp add <server-name> -- <command> [args...]. This is an unvalidated execution sink.
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The skill utilizes npx -y to download and immediately execute packages from the npm registry. In the 'Custom' section, this pattern can be abused to download and run any malicious script or binary.
  • INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): This skill has a high-risk attack surface (Category 8).
  • Ingestion points: The skill explicitly prompts for server names, commands, arguments, and environment variables in the 'Custom' section.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or warnings are used to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in these inputs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses claude mcp add, which spawns subprocesses based on the provided command string.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping for the user-provided command strings.
  • EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (MEDIUM): The skill downloads several packages, including exa-mcp-server and @upstash/context7-mcp. While some packages are from recognized organizations, the skill lacks integrity verification (e.g., checksums) for these remote dependencies.
  • CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE (LOW): The skill requests sensitive information including EXA_API_KEY and a GitHub Personal Access Token. While this is necessary for configuration, passing these as environment variables in a command-line utility can leak them to process monitoring tools or command history.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 16, 2026, 09:18 AM