pr-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to execute system commands includinggit,gh(GitHub CLI), andglab(GitLab CLI). These commands are dynamically constructed using repository owners, names, and PR numbers parsed from user input or remote sources. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. It ingests untrusted data from external PR/MR comments and analyzes them without sufficient isolation, which could be exploited if a comment contains malicious instructions targeted at the agent.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(viagh api,glab api, andWebFetchcalls to PR/MR endpoints). - Boundary markers: Absent (The skill does not specify delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the external content being analyzed).
- Capability inventory:
Bashtool access (allows the agent to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host system). - Sanitization: Absent (There is no logic to sanitize or escape the content of PR comments before they are processed by the LLM).
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to ask the user for Personal Access Tokens (PATs) via
AskUserQuestionif it cannot find existing CLI authentication. While necessary for private repo access, this involves the manual handling of sensitive credentials.
Audit Metadata