content-writer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation script
scripts/install-dependencies.shclones the repositoryhttps://github.com/AgriciDaniel/claude-seoand immediately executesbash install.shfound within that repository. This pattern of downloading and executing arbitrary code from untrusted third-party sources is a high-severity security risk. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill automatically downloads two external skills (
claude-seoandhumanizer) from non-trusted GitHub accounts during the post-installation phase without user verification of the source code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/postinstall.jsandSKILL.mdinstructions utilizeexecSyncand shell commands (e.g.,npm install -g,npm view) to manage updates and dependencies. Running global installations programmatically can lead to privilege escalation or system instability depending on the environment permissions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features a 'URL Scanning' workflow (Phase 1 and Phase 2) that fetches content from arbitrary external URLs using
read_url_content. The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or sanitization steps when processing this external data, making the agent vulnerable to indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in a webpage could override the skill's intended behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The update system described in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to runnpm viewandnpm installautomatically, which involves executing shell commands based on external registry data.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata