find-skills

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 16, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides logic for the agent to interpolate raw user input directly into a shell command string (SKILLSMP_KEY=$(echo "..." | tr -d '\r\n')). This pattern is highly susceptible to command injection if a user provides a string containing shell metacharacters like backticks, semicolons, or subshell syntax.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill promotes the use of npx skills add with both the -g (global installation) and -y (bypass confirmation) flags for packages found via skillsmp.com. Since skillsmp.com is an untrusted third-party source, this workflow could be exploited to silently install malicious code with elevated impact on the user's system.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions specifically target the reading and writing of ~/.claude/settings.json. This file is a sensitive configuration store for the agent environment and may contain other environment variables or security settings.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs automated network requests to https://skillsmp.com to fetch data. This domain is not a recognized trusted service or organization, and the retrieved content is used to determine subsequent code execution (installation commands).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface. It ingests untrusted metadata (skill names and descriptions) from external APIs and processes this data to decide on installation actions. A lack of boundary markers or sanitization means malicious descriptions could influence the agent's decision-making process.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Mar 16, 2026, 03:14 AM