web-browser-automation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- PROMPT_INJECTION (HIGH): The skill's core functionality involves visiting external websites and extracting content, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: Use of
page.goto(),driver.get(), andexecute_javascript()inworkflows.mdand framework-specific reference files.\n - Boundary markers: None identified; extracted web content is introduced directly into the agent context without isolation.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill is explicitly granted
BashandWritetool permissions inSKILL.md. Examples inworkflows.mdalso demonstrate local file writes usingjson.dumpandfs.writeFileSync.\n - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of external content before processing.\n- EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS (LOW): The
playwright installcommand inreferences/playwright-automation.mddownloads browser binaries from Microsoft. This is a trusted source, so the finding is downgraded to LOW per [TRUST-SCOPE-RULE].\n- COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill utilizes theBashtool and frameworks that manage browser subprocesses. While legitimate for automation, this surface could be exploited if the agent is manipulated by malicious web content into executing unintended local commands.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata