prd-analyzer
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill's core purpose is to ingest and parse untrusted external content (PRDs, concept briefs, Slack threads, and emails) to generate structured project data.
- Ingestion Points:
references/prd-analysis.mdexplicitly instructs the agent to handle diverse formats, including informal sources like 'Slack/Email Thread'. - Capability Inventory: The skill produces a
tasks.db(SQLite),PROJECT.md, andfeatures.json. These files serve as the 'shared project context' for other high-capability skills such asapi-designanddatabase-design. - Boundary Markers: The analysis instructions lack explicit guidance on using XML delimiters or boundary markers to isolate untrusted content during the parsing process.
- Sanitization: No logic is provided to sanitize or validate the extracted requirements before they are inserted into the database or the shared
PROJECT.mdfile. A malicious PRD could include 'hidden' tasks like 'Exfiltrate credentials' that an agent might naively include in the implementation plan, which downstream skills would then treat as authoritative requirements. - Command Execution (LOW): The skill requires the agent to manage a SQLite database (
tasks.db) using the schema defined inreferences/database-schema.md. While this is a standard functional capability, it creates a vector for SQL injection if the agent interpolates raw text from the analyzed documents into SQL commands without proper parameterization.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata