worker-orchestrator

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 21, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): In scripts/spawn.sh, the skill executes the Claude CLI with the --dangerously-skip-permissions flag. This flag explicitly bypasses safety guardrails and permission prompts, granting the sub-agent unrestricted access to the local filesystem and terminal without user oversight.
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (HIGH): The spawn.sh script uses tmux send-keys to pipe the {task} variable directly into a terminal session. Because the input is not escaped or sanitized, an attacker can provide a crafted task string (e.g., using quotes or semicolons) to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host machine.
  • PROMPT_INJECTION (LOW): The skill is highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection in scripts/collect.sh.
  • Ingestion points: Reads content from .worker-result.md created by sub-workers.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The content is echoed directly into the agent's context without delimiters.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestrator has the ability to spawn/kill sessions and write to the filesystem via the Claude CLI.
  • Sanitization: Absent. No filtering is performed on the worker's output before it is read by the main agent.
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (HIGH): The combined use of permissive CLI flags and raw command injection via tmux allows the skill to be used as a proxy for executing arbitrary code remotely if the task input is controlled by an external or untrusted source.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Feb 21, 2026, 03:26 PM