skills/stanleyhsu/hello-mcp/md2pdf/Gen Agent Trust Hub

md2pdf

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • COMMAND_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The skill directly executes shell commands involving pandoc and pdflatex. It includes shell loops for batch processing (for file in docs/*.md; do ...), which, while functional, can be risky if file names are maliciously crafted or if the agent executes these without verifying the target directory.
  • REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION (MEDIUM): The troubleshooting section suggests using the flag --pdf-engine-opt=-shell-escape. In LaTeX environments, shell-escape allows the TeX engine to execute arbitrary shell commands. If an attacker provides a markdown file containing malicious LaTeX code (e.g., \write18{...}), enabling this flag would allow full system compromise during the conversion process.
  • INDIRECT PROMPT INJECTION (LOW): The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to the way it processes external data.
  • Ingestion points: Reads and processes markdown files such as input.md and docs/*.md provided by the user or found in the environment.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define delimiters for the markdown content or instruct the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the files.
  • Capability inventory: Uses pandoc to process files, which supports filters and LaTeX engines capable of executing system commands or reading other local files.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no validation or sanitization of the markdown content before it is passed to the PDF engine.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 17, 2026, 06:31 PM