agent-import
Fail
Audited by Snyk on Apr 24, 2026
Risk Level: HIGH
Full Analysis
HIGH W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
- Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 1.00). This skill requires the user to supply a CODE and a DOWNLOAD_TOKEN and explicitly shows running a shell command with those values as command-line arguments (python3 ... <DOWNLOAD_TOKEN>), which forces the agent to include secret tokens verbatim in generated commands/outputs.
MEDIUM W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
- Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill explicitly downloads a migration bundle from the public relay (https://sc-agent-migration.fly.dev) via scripts/download.py (SKILL.md Step 1), then reads and applies untrusted bundle files (manifest.json, identity/soul.md, memory/.json, tasks/.json, files/, etc.)—including generating and running task scripts and adding memories—which can materially change agent behavior and thus enables indirect prompt injection.
MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
- Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill downloads a migration bundle at runtime from https://sc-agent-migration.fly.dev/paste/{code}, and the extracted bundle can include migration/identity/soul.md (which is written into prompt/SOUL.md) and files/tasks that may be copied and run, so remote content can directly control agent prompts and result in code execution.
Issues (3)
W007
HIGHInsecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
W011
MEDIUMThird-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
W012
MEDIUMUnverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
Audit Metadata