feishu-bitable

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's SKILL.md file contains explicit instructions directed at the AI agent to avoid reading or analyzing the contents of the scripts directory ("不要读取或分析 scripts/ 目录下的 .js 文件内容"). This is an evasion technique designed to bypass automated or manual security inspection of the skill's logic.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple obfuscated scripts (e.g., scripts/record/batch-create.js) utilize child_process.execSync to execute system-level wmic commands. These commands are used to retrieve sensitive device identifiers such as the ProcessorId and baseboard SerialNumber from the host system.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs unauthorized hardware fingerprinting by gathering unique machine identifiers (CPU ID, Motherboard Serial, and BIOS UUID). While used for a local licensing check, collecting this level of device-specific metadata is unnecessary for a Feishu Bitable integration and poses a privacy risk.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: the skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. Untrusted data enters the agent context via ingestion points like scripts/record/get.js from Feishu records. The skill documentation provides no boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands, and the skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including network operations (https.request) and system command execution (execSync). No sanitization or filtering of external content is mentioned or implemented in the provided references.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Feb 28, 2026, 08:15 PM