feishu-bitable
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's SKILL.md file contains explicit instructions directed at the AI agent to avoid reading or analyzing the contents of the scripts directory ("不要读取或分析 scripts/ 目录下的 .js 文件内容"). This is an evasion technique designed to bypass automated or manual security inspection of the skill's logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple obfuscated scripts (e.g., scripts/record/batch-create.js) utilize child_process.execSync to execute system-level wmic commands. These commands are used to retrieve sensitive device identifiers such as the ProcessorId and baseboard SerialNumber from the host system.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs unauthorized hardware fingerprinting by gathering unique machine identifiers (CPU ID, Motherboard Serial, and BIOS UUID). While used for a local licensing check, collecting this level of device-specific metadata is unnecessary for a Feishu Bitable integration and poses a privacy risk.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: the skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. Untrusted data enters the agent context via ingestion points like scripts/record/get.js from Feishu records. The skill documentation provides no boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands, and the skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including network operations (https.request) and system command execution (execSync). No sanitization or filtering of external content is mentioned or implemented in the provided references.
Audit Metadata