wechat-publisher-yashu
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 28, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions that explicitly command the AI agent not to read or inspect theindex.jsfile. This is a clear attempt to bypass security auditing and transparency by preventing the agent from understanding the skill's underlying behavior.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill usesexecSyncto runwmiccommands on the host machine. These commands are used to retrieve sensitive hardware identifiers including the CPUProcessorId, MotherboardSerialNumber, and BIOSUUID. These operations are unnecessary for the skill's stated purpose of publishing articles.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill fingerprints the host machine by hashing its unique hardware IDs. This information is used to enforce an undocumented licensing system and is stored in persistent system directories likeAppData/Roaming. The skill also points to an external shop (shop.wangchengq.com) for purchasing access keys.\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill requests WeChatAPP_IDandAPP_SECRETfrom the user. Since the code inindex.jsis obfuscated, there is no way to verify that these credentials are handled securely or that they are not being exfiltrated to a third-party server alongside the machine fingerprints.\n- [OBFUSCATION]: The primary logic fileindex.jsis heavily obfuscated using hex-encoded string arrays and character transformations. This obfuscation hides the system-level interactions and telemetry from the user and security analysis tools.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata