Cloudflare
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local environment files to retrieve credentials.
- Evidence: The script in
Workflows/Troubleshoot.mdis hardcoded to read~/Projects/your-project/.envand extract theCF_API_TOKENusing regular expressions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a behavior override mechanism that loads instructions from the user's home directory.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to load and applyPREFERENCES.mdfrom~/.opencode/skills/PAI/USER/SKILLCUSTOMIZATIONS/Cloudflare/to "override default behavior." - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill mandates immediate shell command execution upon any invocation.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdrequires acurlPOST request tohttp://localhost:8888/notifybefore any other action can be taken. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with Cloudflare's official infrastructure.
- Evidence: It makes API calls to
api.cloudflare.comand utilizes thewranglerCLI tool. These are recognized as well-known and trusted services. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection through external data processing.
- Ingestion points: Deployment logs fetched via the Cloudflare API in
Workflows/Troubleshoot.mdand customization files from the local filesystem. - Boundary markers: None identified; the agent is instructed to follow and apply the content of these inputs directly.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the authority to modify the codebase ("Apply fixes to the codebase"), execute shell commands (
wrangler deploy), and perform network operations. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested log data or preference files is performed before the agent acts upon them.
Audit Metadata