Council

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions explicitly direct the agent to dynamically load and apply resources (such as PREFERENCES.md and other configurations) from a local path (~/.opencode/skills/CORE/USER/SKILLCUSTOMIZATIONS/Council/) to override default behavior. This mechanism allows for runtime modification of the skill's logic based on files present in the user's home directory.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands (curl) to perform network operations targeting localhost:8888 for notifications. This creates a pattern of unauthenticated local inter-process communication via the shell.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection within its debate workflows. It ingests arbitrary user-provided 'Topics' and interpolates them, along with generated transcripts, into prompts for multiple specialized sub-agents across three distinct rounds.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided 'Topic' input in Workflows/Debate.md and Workflows/Quick.md.
  • Boundary markers: None. User input and round transcripts are interpolated directly into agent prompts without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (curl) and trigger various specialized sub-agents including 'Pentester' (Security) and 'Architect' roles.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the user-provided topic or the intermediary agent responses before they are fed into subsequent rounds.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 5, 2026, 07:38 AM