Prompting

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The Standards.md file contains instructions specifically designed to bypass 'Extended Thinking Sensitivity' when disabled, suggesting the use of alternative verbs like 'consider' or 'evaluate' instead of 'think'. This represents a technique to influence agent behavior against intended model constraints.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture is designed for Indirect Prompt Injection by default (Category 8). It ingests untrusted YAML/JSON data and interpolates it directly into prompt templates without sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: Tools/RenderTemplate.ts (via loadData function) and Templates/Data/*.yaml files.
  • Boundary markers: The system suggests using markdown headers for structure in Standards.md, but the rendering engine does not enforce or automatically apply boundary markers or 'ignore embedded instructions' delimiters to interpolated variables.
  • Capability inventory: Tools/RenderTemplate.ts executes subprocesses via Bun.spawnSync, and SKILL.md contains a curl command for local notifications.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization of data variables before they are rendered into the final prompt.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Tools/RenderTemplate.ts script utilizes Bun.spawnSync(['ls', partialsDir]) to dynamically list files in the partials directory. While targeting a directory derived from the script location, this pattern involves spawning a shell-level process to discover resources.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 5, 2026, 07:38 AM