Prompting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
Standards.mdfile contains instructions specifically designed to bypass 'Extended Thinking Sensitivity' when disabled, suggesting the use of alternative verbs like 'consider' or 'evaluate' instead of 'think'. This represents a technique to influence agent behavior against intended model constraints. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture is designed for Indirect Prompt Injection by default (Category 8). It ingests untrusted YAML/JSON data and interpolates it directly into prompt templates without sanitization.
- Ingestion points:
Tools/RenderTemplate.ts(vialoadDatafunction) andTemplates/Data/*.yamlfiles. - Boundary markers: The system suggests using markdown headers for structure in
Standards.md, but the rendering engine does not enforce or automatically apply boundary markers or 'ignore embedded instructions' delimiters to interpolated variables. - Capability inventory:
Tools/RenderTemplate.tsexecutes subprocesses viaBun.spawnSync, andSKILL.mdcontains acurlcommand for local notifications. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization of data variables before they are rendered into the final prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
Tools/RenderTemplate.tsscript utilizesBun.spawnSync(['ls', partialsDir])to dynamically list files in the partials directory. While targeting a directory derived from the script location, this pattern involves spawning a shell-level process to discover resources.
Audit Metadata