Research

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it is fundamentally designed to retrieve and process untrusted data from the internet.
  • Ingestion points: Data is fetched from arbitrary URLs, search results, and YouTube transcripts via WebFetch, fabric, and specialized scraping MCPs in Workflows/Retrieve.md and Workflows/YoutubeExtraction.md.
  • Boundary markers: The workflows lack explicit instructions or delimiters in their prompts to ensure that the agent ignores any instructions embedded within the retrieved content.
  • Capability inventory: Researcher agents (GeminiResearcher, DeepResearcher) used for synthesis have the capability to influence local filesystem writes in the history directory and subsequent logic flows.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or filtering before the ingested data is passed to the LLM for analysis.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs various command-line operations for its core functionality.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md uses curl to send JSON payloads to a local notification service at localhost:8888.
  • Evidence: Workflows/Fabric.md and Workflows/YoutubeExtraction.md execute the fabric CLI for content analysis and transcription tasks.
  • Evidence: Workflows/ExtensiveResearch.md and UrlVerificationProtocol.md use curl to perform HTTP status checks on external URLs during mandatory link verification.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill programmatically downloads external dependencies to maintain its toolset.
  • Evidence: Workflows/Fabric.md executes a git clone command to download the fabric-project/fabric repository from GitHub if the directory is missing, ensuring the latest patterns are available for the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 5, 2026, 07:39 AM