codeagent
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides explicit instructions to bypass security filters and permission prompts. Evidence: The documentation describes how to use the
CODEAGENT_SKIP_PERMISSIONSenvironment variable or the--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag to disable safety checks for the Claude backend. Risk: This encourages a configuration that intentionally removes standard safety guardrails during automated execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes an external CLI tool to perform arbitrary tasks on the local filesystem. Evidence: Commands such as `codeagent-wrapper --backend codex
- [working_dir] <<'EOF'` are used to pipe task content directly into the execution engine. Risk: This allows for complex operations to be performed on the user's codebase based on instructions which may originate from untrusted sources or compromised AI backends.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill facilitates sending local file content to external AI service providers. Evidence: The
@syntax (e.g.,@src/core,@package.json) allows the tool to reference and read local files, incorporating their content into the data sent to Codex, Claude, or Gemini backends. Risk: This represents a data exposure risk where sensitive source code or configuration files are transmitted to third-party APIs without a granular review. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill enables a workflow where remote AI backends generate code that is subsequently applied or executed in the local environment. Risk: If a backend returns malicious code or is subject to a prompt injection attack, that code could be applied to the local system via the wrapper's automation features, potentially leading to unauthorized system modifications.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: (Indirect Prompt Injection Surface) The skill processes untrusted data which could contain malicious instructions. Ingestion points: The
taskparameter and files referenced via the@syntax inSKILL.md. Boundary markers: Absent; the skill uses HEREDOC syntax for tasks but does not define delimiters to separate instructions from data content. Capability inventory: Thecodeagent-wrappertool performs file system modifications, code generation, and complex refactoring across multiple files. Sanitization: Absent; there is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the input task or the content of referenced files before they are processed by the AI backends.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata